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 3 
Introduction 
 
Since the inception of the African Development Bank (ADB and later AfDB) in 1964, the 
political importance of the Bank has been apparent. The AfDB is an international institution 
that has remained under control of its borrowing member states; the African or so called 
regional states. The developing states collectively decided how to tackle poverty and foster 
development to the exclusion of non-African or non-regional states. Later, two separate 
institutions: the African Development Fund (ADF) and the Nigerian Trust Fund (NTF), 
together with the Bank formed the African Development Bank Group. Although 
economically, the Bank played a marginal role until 1982 due to the very fact that it wanted to 
exclude non-regional states from becoming members, after the admittance of non-regional 
states in 1982 the effective control of the Bank remained in African hands (Mingst, 1990). 
The strong political character of the Bank has resulted in increased salience of competing 
political views within the Bank (Mingst, 1990). Understanding how political factors can 
influence the power of IOs not only contributes to academic literature regarding theories of 
delegation, but also provides a framework for states to monitor this, as well as other 
international organizations (IOs). Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to analyze the 
relationship between politicization and the autonomy of the AfDB. More specifically, to 
answer the question to what extend politicization influences the level of autonomy of the 
AfDB. The purpose of the Bank before the admission of non-regional states was to contribute 
to the sustainable economic and social progress of Africa in a ‘by Africa, for Africa’ fashion 
(African Development Bank [AfDB] in Udo, 1975). Unlike the Latin American Development 
Bank and the World Bank, the AfDB solely consisted of borrowing states up until 1982 when 
states outside of Africa (non-regional states) were admitted to increase the Bank’s lending 
capacity while maintaining the African character (Krasner, 1981). The authorized capital of 
the Bank slowly increased over a 19-year period until 1982 when it more than doubled as a 
result of non-regional states joining the Bank. Since 1974, the Bank had increased its lending 
targets, but disbursements had not increased by the same rate, resulting in an increasing 
capital gap (Fordwor, 1981, pp. 69-74). The Bank did not open up to non-regionals sooner, 
because there was a fear among the member states that the opening-up of the Bank would lead 
to the loss of African control over the Bank. Due to the history of colonial exploitation, the 
African leaders agreed on establishing a development institution that would not be susceptible 
to extra-regional political influence (English & Mule). This provides a unique institutional 
character. As a guide to the analysis, a contemporary diagram of the institution’s 
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organizational structure is presented below. This research mainly focuses on the center 
bodies; the Board of Governors, the Board of Directors (hereafter referred to as the Board) 
and the president. The latter controls the management of the Bank and its staff. The Board of 
Governors determines the general direction of the Bank, while the Board oversees the 
president’s conduct and has to approve short term plans of management. This institutional 
design renders conflict between the Board and management an intricate issue.  
 
 Figure 1. AfDB Organization Chart – May 2nd 2017. Reprinted from AfDB website, by the African Development Bank, 2017, 
 retrieved from: https://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/organisational-structure/  
 
In this thesis the focus of analysis will lie on three issue areas: 
1. Resource mobilization which led to the acceptance of opening-up the Bank’s capital 
stock; 
2. The ‘Fordwor Controversy’: an institutional impasse between the president and the 
Board as a result of the Board’s dissatisfaction about the president’s institutional role; 
3. Staff expansion: a technical policy area which has not been hotly debated in the 
highest institutional organ. 
Due to the increasing financing gap, the member states had to choose between having the 
Bank continue to play a marginal role in the development of Africa, or having the Bank open-
up to non-regional states to increase the Bank’s role while decreasing African control over the 
Bank. This immanent dilemma increased the politicization of the Bank. The clash of the 
president and the Board of Directors, partly a result of the role that the president had played in 
the mobilization of resources, increased the level of politicization in the bank as well. On the 
contrary, although staff related issues have been politicized at times, the issue of staff 
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expansion in particular has remained in the depoliticized sphere. In the principal-agent 
relationship, where the principals are the member states and the agent is the Bank, the 
principals set up monitoring mechanisms and delegate authority to the agent. The amounts of 
discretion and autonomy available to the agent vary from policy area to policy area (AfDB, 
2011). Additionally, varying preferences and the importance of these preferences play a role 
in the autonomy of the agent. In the following section, existing literature on international 
cooperation and principal-agent (PA) theory will be reviewed and the contradictory 
expectation following from the literature will be used as starting point for the analysis. 
 
 
 
Review of PA Theory 
 
Barnett and Finnemore (1999) challenge the view of regime theory (Krasner, 1983; 
Rittberger, 1993), which asserts that IOs are structures rather than actors. This thesis follows 
that notion and treats IOs as actors possessing agency. Once an IO is created, it is often 
depoliticized as a means to ensure efficiency, efficacy and legitimacy. The depoliticized 
character IOs present themselves with, being impartial, impersonal and technocratic also 
allows them to exert power onto their principal (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). While exerting 
power onto the principal is one form of autonomous behavior, autonomy can take various 
forms depending on the factors that facilitate it (Vaubel, 2006; Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; 
Darren et al., 2006; Stone, 2011). Barnett and Finnemore (1999) argue that the principal-agent 
dichotomy is difficult to apply to international institutions, for in many cases the discrepancy 
is between the international organization and the states that created and/or control them is 
unobservable, because the preferences of the agent are unknown. In this view, international 
organizations are not merely the instruments through which states can exert their power or 
pursue their interests. Guzman (2013) acknowledges the potential independent action of IOs 
as well and argues that, precisely because of this, states are increasingly restraining their IOs 
to prevent them from becoming uncontrollable. He calls this the ‘Frankenstein problem’. 
However, contrary to Dr. Frankenstein, states are aware of the possibility that an IO which 
they created acts against their interests and therefore overly control their IOs to the point 
where harming their founding states becomes impossible. This limits the notion that IOs can 
influence their own principals. A widely used measure to restrain IOs being more demanding 
voting requirements so that the IO cannot make decisions in defiance of the preferences of the 
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member states. The problem with voting rules, however, is that they do not necessarily 
constrain IO influence on their member states, because the IO can use the voting system to 
further its agenda by persuading member states of their preferences. Indeed, states can 
influence the IO by using their votes, but IOs can influence the way in which states vote. 
However, the technical and impartial demeanor of IOs are not sufficient prerequisites of this 
form of autonomy 
 
The three types of principal-agency relationships observable in interstate cooperation are 
presented below. The ‘collective principal’ model is most observed in development 
cooperation; there are multiple member states that have to reach a collective decision by 
voting (Lyne, Nielson & Tierney, 2006). In contrast, in the European Union, the European 
Commission has a dual accountability towards two principals; the member states and the 
citizens (Christiansen, 1997). 
 
 
 Figure 2. Types of agency relationships. Reprinted from Delegation and agency in international organizations (p. 45), by 
 D. G. Hawkins, D. A. Lake, D. L. Nielson, & M. J. Tierney (Eds.), 2006, Cambridge University Press. Copyright 2006 by 
 Cambridge University Press. 
 
The collective principal, treated as one entity does, of course, have several different intrinsic 
preferences. Either consensus has to be reached or votes have to be casted in order for a 
collective preference to emerge. Vaubel (2006) draws the relationship beyond the state and 
argues that the citizens of the member states are the ultimate principals of the IOs. IOs suffer 
from PA problems more than other institutions, because the chain of delegation is longer and 
the main controlling actors, the member states, are often misled by the IO (Vaubel, 1991, 
1996). Where misleading occurs, there is a clear discrepancy between the preference of the 
principal and that of the IO, where the IO ‘slacks’. Darren et al. (2006) defined agent slack as 
follows: “independent action by an agent that is undesired by the principal. Slack occurs in 
two primary forms: shirking, when an agent minimizes the effort it exerts on its principal’s 
behalf, and slippage, when an agent shifts policy away from its principal’s preferred outcome 
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and towards its own preferences” (p. 8). Regarding autonomy in IOs in general, Darren et al. 
(2006) argue that it fosters the desirable situation in which it “increases the likelihood that 
over some unknown number of future disputes regarding unforeseen issues, an individual 
principal is likely to ‘win’ as many times as it ‘loses.’ This permits the agreement to go 
forward on a ‘risk neutral’ basis” (p. 18). However, this assumes the depoliticized character of 
principal’s preferences and leaves open the question of whether principals deem it desirable 
for the agent to have autonomy in the situation in which a dispute regarding an unforeseen 
issue is politically salient and highly contentious. Assuming that a dispute of such magnitude 
will likely rarely happen, the cost of delegation suddenly becomes extremely high for the 
principals which would be disfavored by the autonomous decision of the agent. Although, in 
practice, such an issue will most likely be voted on by the principals, can the agent influence 
the voting behavior of the principals regarding the issue? With respect to this question, the 
collective principal model cannot provide a useful framework, for it assumes a single 
preference and does not take into account any potential influence on individual preferences of 
principals. An important aspect that influences this relationship is the design of the institution 
itself, especially voting rules. Cortel & Peterson (2006), and Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 
(2001) discuss the varying ways in which voting power can be distributed in international 
institutions. When neither one, nor a small group of principals can impose its preference on 
the others, the role of the agent increases; agents can use their autonomy to influence future 
decisions by principals (Darren et al. 2006). In this sense, agency slippage can result in a 
change in policy direction which could potentially have a tremendous impact on the future of 
the institution itself.  
 
The literature suggests that 1) there is a positive relationship between the amount of principals 
required to approve an action and the equality of voting power on the one hand, and the extent 
to which the institution they control can exert autonomy on the other (Darren et al., 2006). 2) 
Significant preference heterogeneity among principals allows for more agent autonomy 
(Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991; Nielson & Tierney 2003, as cited in Cortell & Peterson, 2006). 
3) An IO is expected to have less autonomy when the preferences of the member states are 
politically salient i.e., when the institution is politicized due to the perceived increase in costs 
of delegation. The idea behind the first relationship is that a large amount of principals with 
conflicting preferences decreases the likelihood of an agreed upon set of measures to be taken 
in case of agency slack, because there needs to be agreement on whether or no to act against 
agency slack, and if so, in what way. The second relationship takes into account the 
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convergence/divergence of preferences. The third takes into account the politicization of 
interests. Stone (2011) suggests that multiple principals with divergent preferences leads to 
agent discretion. Copelovitch (2010) argues that heterogeneity either leads to conflict among 
principals or creates a scope for the agent to engage in agency slack. However, he does not 
take into account the aforementioned possibility that the conflict itself can be exploited by the 
agent to influence the preferences of the principal. Multiple principals having converging 
preferences will lead to a more constrained agent, because it is not costly to heavily monitor 
and possibly restrict the agent’s discretion. Conversely, many principals with diverging 
preferences will result in more agent autonomy, for agreeing on the degree to which the agent 
should be limited will be more difficult (Milner, 2006).  
 
The aforementioned contributions in the literature provide an incomplete theoretical 
framework. While a set of heterogeneous preferences carrying proportional weight in terms of 
voting is expected to increase the level of autonomy of the IO, when conflicting preferences 
become highly politicized often as a result of unforeseen circumstances, it is expected to 
decrease the level of autonomy of the IO. On the one hand, the interests of the principals are 
perceived to be of high importance and the agent will therefore most likely be kept in check. 
On the other hand, conflicting preferences make it more difficult to keep the agent in check 
and may facilitate the option of persuasion for the agent to alter the preference of the 
collective principal. This gap in the literature can be resolved by analyzing different cases of 
the Bank in which the level of politicization varies and both the preferences of the principals 
and the agent are known. In this way it becomes possible to detect any difference in agent 
autonomy. The main argument in this thesis following from the existing literature is that 
preference divergence alone is not a sufficient precondition for increased agent autonomy. 
Rather, politicization increases the level of agent autonomy due to the possibility for the agent 
to engage in persuasion of the principals in the way Barnett and Finnemore (1999) and Darren 
et al. (2006) described. 
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Conceptualization and Operational Definitions 
 
Principal and Agent 
 
The most important concepts of this study are indeed the independent and dependent variable; 
politicization and autonomy. However, it is not unimportant to clearly define the main actors 
involved in the case: the principal and the agent. The two actors are defined by the 
relationship they have with each other. The principal is the actor that delegates authority to its 
agent and the agent is the actor that receives this grant of authority. Darren et al. (2006, p. 7) 
note that the delegation of authority is conditional and thus must be revocable by the 
principal.  
 
The principal and the agent are operationally defined as follows: the executive management 
of the Bank, including the president, is the agent and the member states of the Bank are 
categorized as principals. It should be noted that the principal is not analyzed as one entity in 
this research. Since the research question regards the AfDB as a whole, both choices of 
operational definitions have some obvious shortcomings. The former has the problem that, 
despite the fact that the president represents the Bank, neither the president, nor management 
and staff are ‘the institution’ itself. The members of the Board are pro forma in between 
management and the Board of Governors in terms of delegated authority (see figure 1). The 
directors are part of the Bank and not directly steered by their home state, instead they 
represent constituencies (English & Mule, 1996, pp. 40-41). Moreover, directors can act 
against the preferences of the member states they represent once they are elected (Tirole, 
1994). However, since the Board is not the managing organ in the chain of delegation, the 
focus will lie on the president and his staff instead. Though in the cases of l’Affaire Fordwor 
and staff expansion, the role of the Board as agents will be touched on. The political 
relationship between the president and the Board is a manifestation of the institutional design 
of checks and balances (AfDB, 2011) and clearly highlights that treating the Bank as a single 
agent, or the president as sole agent does not capture the inner-relationships of the Bank. 
However, the president is the formal head of the executive and of the Bank as a whole; he has 
the role of setting up the framework through which the Bank will operate during his term of 
office. The other members of management and staff usually follow suit, although issues of 
integrity have also plagued ordinary staff members (Hafsi & Le Louarn, n.d.). The usage of 
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governors’ preferences as the preferences of the member states follows from the fact that the 
governors are members of the government of their home states (Mingst, 1990).  
 
 
Politicization 
 
When analyzing the reason why some IOs become politicized, Zürn, Binder and Ecker-
Ehrhardt (2012) use the conceptualization of Smith (2004), where politicization is 
conceptualized as follows: “the demand for, or the act of, transporting an issue into the field 
of politics, making previously un-political matters political” (p. 73). They further specify this 
by defining the field of politics as being a public forum for scrutiny over collectively binding 
decisions by increased societal awareness and public mobilization of concerns (Zürn et al., 
2012). Smith’s conceptualization will be used here, excluding the definition of the field of 
politics by Zürn et al. (2012). The reason for this exclusion is that the main focus lies on the 
politicization of the preferences of the member states and not those of the civilians of the 
member states, despite the fact that they are indeed the ultimate principals of any IO, provided 
that they are citizens of a democratic state (Vaubel, 2006). It would be a near-impossible task 
to measure the preferences of the citizens of the member states, aggregate them to a collective 
preference and analyze any potential discrepancies between that preference and the one of the 
Bank. Instead, the preferences of the member states of the Bank were known during that 
period, which makes it realizable to analyze the relationship between the two variables and 
can provide important insights. Therefore, the political field will incorporate non-technocratic 
discussions at the level of the Board of Governors. In other words, the intrusion of political 
interests on the Bank’s technocracy (Roach, 2006).  
 
Politicization is operationally defined as increased salience of competing political preferences 
at the level of the member states and the Board of Governors. In the first case, the three main 
meetings of the Board of Governors that will be discussed show the extent to which an issue 
is politicized. In the second case, the extraordinary meeting of the Board of Governors as well 
as intra-organizational communications will be analyzed. The difficulty or inability to reach 
consensus and the repetition of standpoint of certain governors indicate the level of 
politicization in all cases. The shortcoming of analyzing consensus seeking during meetings is 
that this requires reliance on the Bank’s sources which are published in another source. 
Additionally, it does not take into account politicization outside of Board meetings. 
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Therefore, an additional indicator: the repetitive voicing of competing preferences, is added to 
in order to incorporate intra-organizational communications.  
 
 
Autonomy 
 
In many scholarly works regarding delegation and principal-agent problems, autonomy is not 
explicitly defined (Guzman, 2011; Cortell & Peterson, 2006; Lake & McCubbins, 2006). 
However, the conceptualization of autonomy can be derived from their arguments. Broadly 
meaning ‘independent action’; independent from the principal. Darren et al. (2006) add that it 
must be a range of available independent action to the agent. This means that when the 
preferences of the principal and the agent converge, compliance by the agent does not 
necessarily indicate the absence of autonomy. Conversely, non-compliance of the agent 
always indicates autonomy. In order to measure this, however, both the preference of the 
principal and of the agent need to be known empirically or theoretically.  
 
The indicators for autonomy are twofold. Regarding the issue of resource mobilization and 
the the clash of the president and the Board, autonomy is indicated by an instance in which 
the former president of the AfDB, Kwame Fordwor, and his team of staff pursue their 
preferences in the form of an attempt to persuade one or more principals to act according to 
their preference. In other words, the operationalization is focused on agency slippage. 
Regarding the issue of staff, Vaubel (2006) argues that the expansion of staff and the increase 
in salary are indicators of autonomy, for IOs are self-interested entities. If, therefore, staff 
expansions are disproportionally high in relation to the growth of the institution as determined 
by other indicators, autonomous behavior is observed. As Barnett & Finnemore (1989) 
argued, “the problem with applying principal-agent analysis to the study of IOs is that it 
requires a priori theoretical specification of what IOs want” (p. 705). Aside from Vaubel’s 
(2006) theoretical conceptualization of autonomy, it would be an irresponsible stretch to 
relate the preference of the executive of the AfDB to what IOs want in general. Fordwor’s 
personal account of his presidency contains his own vision for the AfDB. Management’s 
preference on staff expansion has been researched by English & Mule (1996), and the 
theoretical framework of Vaubel will be used to fortify the identified preference of 
management. Since both the preferences of management and the preferences of the member 
states are known, any potential disjuncture between the two can be observed. The 
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politicization of preferences of the member states would make the bargaining process 
susceptible to the influence of the agent. An act of persuasion on the part of the agent in this 
scenario is an act of autonomy made possible by the increased salience of political 
preferences. Disproportionally high staff increases indicate autonomy, but do not unveil a 
particular act of autonomy, however.  
 
 
 
Methodology 
 
Cases 
 
The methodology used to answer the question to what extent politicization influences the 
level of autonomy of the AfDB, as stated in the introduction, is a qualitative research where 
three separate case studies of issue areas in the Bank varying on the level of politicization will 
be analyzed. This allows for a within-case study (Della Porta & Keating, 2008). The cases 
show increased autonomy in situations where part of the theory of PA does not predict it. In 
this respect, the cases are deviant (Bennett & Elman, 2007). However, another part of the 
theory does predict increased autonomy, but misses the importance of politicization. The first 
case regards resource mobilization during the Fordwor presidency. The second regards the 
clash between the president and the Board during the same presidential period, and the third 
regards the issue of staff expansion. The reason for the choice of the 1976-1979 presidential 
period, as briefly touched upon in the introduction, is that this period was critical to the 
admission of non-regional states in 1982 and was dominated by the issues of resource 
mobilization and the relationship between the president and the Board. Within this period, 
both non-politicized and politicized events took place. The case of resource mobilization was 
politicized from the very start at the Kinshasa Meeting. However, the issue of the relationship 
between the Board and the president started off as relatively depoliticized i.e., the member 
states were not politically involved. It progressed into a politicized issue and this affected the 
range of independent action of both the president and the directors in this case. The issue of 
staff expansion, contrary to both other issues, has always remained relatively depoliticized. 
Remarkably so, because staff has been a widely debated issue in the Bank. Although the case 
selection provides an environment in which the relationship of politicization and autonomy 
can be observed, it also has some limitations. Namely, the partial ability of the agent to set the 
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agenda can interfere with the expected causal mechanism of the two variables. An issue that 
has not been put on the agenda cannot be politicized and it is therefore possible for the agent 
to help facilitate a situation in which issues become more or less likely to be politicized. 
However, the agent cannot forcibly politicize the preferences of its principals, for the 
politicization is determined by the dynamics of the relationships amongst principals and the 
perceived importance of the issue on which they form their preferences and not by the fact 
that the issue is discussed an sich. In short, within the case of the AfDB, three events that vary 
on the independent variable will be analyzed in order to better understand the dynamics of the 
principal-agent relationship within the Bank and in particular the level of autonomy of the 
agent. It may be recalled that the PA theory predicts two contradicting outcomes regarding the 
influence of politicization on autonomy. 1) Since the salience of preferences of the member 
states regarding an issue increases, it is expected that they do not want their preferences to be 
undermined and will therefore constrain the agent. 2) Heterogeneity in preferences is 
expected to grant the agent more autonomy, because disagreement on the agent’s actions will 
be likely, provided that these heterogeneous preferences are indeed of high importance in a 
given situation. 
 
 
Sources  
 
As a result of the poor documentation of the Bank’s activities until quite recently (Lawrence, 
2007), the main sources for this research are secondary and consist of the personal account of 
Kwame Fordwor, several descriptive books that cover the early years of the existence of the 
Bank, several articles about the role of the Bank and possible issues, and studies on the 
performance of the Bank. In addition to these sources, the relevant and available Bank 
documents will be used. Despite the debatable credibility of personal accounts (Bryman, 
2012), Fordwor’s account is still a useful source. Firstly, there are Bank documents such as 
resolutions and communications published in their entirety within the book, which are not 
publicly available through the Bank’s database. Although it is unlikely that any of these 
documents have been altered, it cannot be fully excluded. Secondly, although one of the 
purposes of the book was, in his own words, a ‘personal defense’ (Fordwor, 1981, p. xiii), the 
fact that he tries to defend his actions is not of importance to the research question. The fact 
that he engaged in those actions, however, is of importance. These attempts to justify his 
actions therefore do not pose a significant threat to the validity of the research. Although he 
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denied some accusations by the Board regarding integrity issues, he thoroughly described 
many instances of autonomous action regarding his efforts to persuade the governors. 
Moreover, the agent’s preference is given in this case, which makes it possible to observe any 
agency slippage. Furthermore, a detailed first-hand account of the inner workings of a 
multilateral development bank such as the AfDB provides a unique insight into the dynamics 
of such an institution. However, the limitations posed by the lack of available primary 
documentation should not be ignored. 
 
 
 
Analysis of Cases 
 
Resource Mobilization 
 
The origins of the competing preferences in this case were that of African control versus 
increased resources. While some member states accepted the idea of allowing non-regional 
states to become members of the Bank, others opposed this idea on the grounds of losing 
control of the Bank. It was feared that non-regional states would draw in new criteria to the 
lending process that were thus far excluded by the Bank’s policies, such as exerting political 
on borrowing states through governance (Bøås, 1998). It should be noted that before 1982, the 
Bank aimed at utilizing the resources at its disposal to facilitate its development financing 
(Agumadu, 1981). Resources were to be mobilized inside and outside of Africa (Mubiru, 
1964). How, and how much of those resources were to be mobilized was not specified, for 
this depended on the approved plan of action by the Board of Governors.  
 
During the Kinshasa Meeting in 1976, Kwame Fordwor won the presidential election with 
50.66% of the votes (Mingst, 1990). Before his assumption of duty, the governors discussed 
the opening-up of the Bank’s capital stock as a result of an increasing capital gap. This 
initiated an increased salience in competing preferences among the member states and their 
governors. Due to steadfast disagreement, no consensus could be reached and the matter was 
put to a vote. Those in favor of opening-up the Bank’s capital stock to non-regional states lost 
with a mere 18.01% versus 58.70. The rest formally abstained or did not participate in the 
vote (Fordwor, 1981, pp. 57-58). It is true that the question of opening-up was not new, 
however the approved five-year plan required extra resources to cover the gap and to be able 
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to increase the Bank’s lending targets. The Bank relied on little resources, but the 
mobilization of resources was not a politicized issue until the Kinshasa Meeting. The accepted 
five-year plan which required more resources than available, could have been rejected by the 
Board of Governors. Instead, it was accepted (Fordwor, 1981), inevitably leading to the 
contradiction of wanting to enhance the Bank’s role in Africa’s development, while not 
allowing lending states to add to the capital of the Bank by purchasing shares. The outcome of 
the vote paved the way for those against the opening-up of the capital stock to put forward 
and adopt the Kinshasa Resolution. The core of this resolution was the instruction to the 
president to take the necessary steps to facilitate resource mobilization to the exclusion of 
non-regional states (Fordwor, 1981, p. 90).
1
 
 
However, mostly all states that were approached ruled out the possibility of extending grants 
and sufficient concessionary loans to the Bank. the main reason for this was the fact that non-
regional states were not allowed to be represented in the Bank and could therefore not 
monitor or influence the spending of these grants and soft loans; they had no voting rights 
(Barnes, 1984). They would not be able to justify spending on the Bank before their 
parliaments due to the absence of any bargaining power within the Bank (Putnam, 1988). 
Concessionary loans had amounted to a total of 12 million over a time period of 13 years, 
which was good for a mere two projects (Fordwor, 1981). From the outset, it would have been 
unlikely that this amount was going to increase dramatically. Many of the Arab states decided 
to engage in bilateral development aid and pledged minimal amounts to the ADF, the soft-
loan window of the Bank Group (Fordwor, 1981).  
 
An additional reason for lack of funds in this period was the struggle of many member states 
to contribute to the AfDB due to the 1970s oil shocks (Lawrence, 2007). This explains why 
Fordwor did not suggest a General Capital Increase at the time, for it would be futile to ask 
member and thus borrowing states to increase their contributions. However, management was 
not merely seeking to secure capital in accordance with the Kinshasa resolution. Fordwor “felt 
it his duty to try again” (Fordwor, 1981, p. 91). Therefore, in addition to simply asking 
foreign heads of states for grants, concessionary loans and direct loans, management decided 
to extensively report on the search for resource mobilization as follows: 
 
                                                     
1 See appendix document 1a 
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“[…] we came to the conclusion that we could inoffensively steer the governors to 
look at this option once more by asking them for leave to study it in depth and report 
to them. […] We would profit by the same exercise to draw up a feasibility study of 
how it could be done […]” (Fordwor, 1981, p. 97). 
 
This study resulted in another debate of the issue among member states during the Port Louis 
Meeting. However, this time, again after a vote, they came to a different conclusion. Namely 
that this time the instruction was given to the president to consult closely with the Board 
while continuing the study on permanent resource mobilization while maintaining the African 
character of the Bank
2
. Interestingly, where the first resolution spoke of consultation with the 
governors if necessary, the second resolution spoke of ‘close consultation with the Board of 
Directors’. This indicates that at least some governors did not trust management to conduct 
the study on its own. The ambiguity of the term ‘African character’ made it possible for 
management to also focus on non-regional inclusion. At the same time, management could 
not exclude regional member’s contributions either. However, when Nigeria was unable to 
lend to the Bank the president said the following: 
 
“[…] it fortified us in our belief that the resource problem could only be solved from 
outside, and it confirmed us in our determination to advocate this unequivocally” 
(Fordwor, 1981, p. 102). 
 
The definition of the term ‘African character’ was discussed with the ministers of finance of 
both regional and non-regional states to enquire about their views. Ultimately, however, the 
ambiguity of the term granted management the autonomy to fill it in. Before the next meeting 
of governors; the Libreville Meeting, management paid the Ivorian governor a visit to try to 
persuade him to advocate the opening-up of the Bank before he would come to open the 
meeting, which he did. In addition: 
 
“We suggested that it would go down better if he invited all the governors to a 
preliminary private audience in the palace an hour before the ceremony so that he 
could stress to them the need for the opening up” (Fordwor, 1981, p. 114). 
 
                                                     
2 See appendix document 1b 
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Furthermore, booklets were created and supplied to each member state capital, as well as each 
professional staff member in order for them to sell the idea of opening-up when discussing it 
with their home states. At the top management level, Fordwor sought to mobilize political 
support: 
 
“Those ministers and heads of state who would see us we went directly to see. We 
encouraged our supporters and they in turn gave us courage and lent their assistance 
to us by contacting our more difficult members in the special language of African 
political dialogue” (Fordwor, 1981, p. 118) 
 
One of the more difficult members was indeed Algeria. The overall narrative regarding the 
opening-up campaign was that of us-versus-them. Us being management and professional 
staff and them being the member states which did not share their preference: 
 
“If we managed to persuade the majority, they would respect its views. This was a 
challenge we were thankful to accept” (Fordwor, 1981, p. 118). 
 
During the Libreville Meeting, the principle of opening-up the capital stock was accepted by 
consensus
3
. The members that supported this before the issue was debated at this meeting 
were of the opinion that the Bank could be structured in such a way that regional members 
would maintain control by having the majority of shares (Barnes, 1984). However, a handful 
of influential states, such as Algeria, still publicly held a strong stance against the resolution. 
Therefore, Fordwor decided to try to present the West African states as a consolidated block 
at ECOWAS in favor of opening-up the Bank’s capital stock so that the opponents that were 
left regardless of the consensus would be deterred from engaging in obstructive behavior: 
 
“[…] as regards my request to get his minister of finance and planning to raise the 
matter at ECOWAS ministerial meeting in order that the issue will be discussed at the 
heads of state level, he was agreeable to do so. He was also going to engage in some 
quiet diplomacy to see to it that Algeria did not go ahead with their plans” (Fordwor, 
1981, p. 178). 
 
                                                     
3 See appendix document 1c 
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In sum, the very politicization of the issue of resource mobilization in the forms of three 
successive meetings dominated by the issue and member states reiterating the fact that they 
opposed the idea of opening-up, facilitated the acts of persuasion undertaken by management, 
which held the opinion that the capital stock should be opened to non-regional states. Instead 
of facilitating self-interested agency slack, the salient heterogeneity of preferences facilitated 
influence of the agent on the outcome of the collective preference, since one of the two 
possible preferences in this case was held by the agent himself. Management reported on the 
necessity for an in depth study on permanent resource mobilization and stressed the 
reevaluation of opening-up (Fordwor, 1981). The outcome of this was an ambiguous term 
which made it possible to influence member states further. In the second sitting of the 
Libreville Meeting, the principle of opening-up was accepted.
4
 
 
 
l’Affaire Fordwor 
 
During the struggle with respect to the opening-up of the Bank, the President undoubtedly 
played an active role in favor of opening-up. Some of his actions were condemned by the 
Board, which, in a communication to the president stated that these ‘unilateral actions’ were 
unacceptable and that the president should not be a ‘major player’ in determining the Bank’s 
direction (Board of Directors in Fordwor, 1981). Aside from this, the Board expressed other 
grievances regarding the president’s integrity. Clashes between the Board and the president 
were not uncommon in the Bank (Adams & Davis, 1996). However, this clash resulted in an 
organizational impasse. 
 
Fordwor himself claims that political motives with respect to reelection of directors resulted 
in the Board undermining him (Fordwor, 1981). The high possibility for bias of both Fordwor 
and the directors combined with a lack of actual evidence does not allow for any conclusions 
regarding the actual reason why Fordwor was eventually put on indefinite open leave. 
However, his effort to prevent this from happening further denotes the politicization-
autonomy dynamic. In the previous case, the governors were susceptible to persuasion 
because their competing preferences became increasingly salient. In this case, however, a 
transition from depoliticization to politicization takes place and the effect this had on 
                                                     
4 See appendix document 1c 
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Fordwor’s power to persuade becomes visible. Disputes between the Board and the president 
have occurred frequently since the Bank’s inception as a result of accusations against 
management by the Board (Mingst, 1996), and vice versa (Adams & Davis, 1996). Both 
President Fordwor and N’Diaye, who held office from 1980 to 1995, have had authority 
related issues with the Board (Adams & Davis, 1996). In a communication, the directors 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the actions of the president and the role he played in 
resource mobilization. In particular, they denounced his ‘unilateral actions’ such as the 
opening of a de facto foreign office, foreign visits without consulting the Board, and his 
active role in the opening-up campaign. Seven of the nine directors signed the 
communication, while two was absent (Board of Directors in Fordwor, 1981). Fordwor 
replied to the allegations, admitting to taking some actions without the Board’s approval 
while convinced that he was not required to do so according to the charter. With respect to 
other matters he denied allegations completely. The Board eventually passed a resolution in 
which they terminated Fordwor’s presidency and installed an acting president (Board of 
Governors in Fordwor, 1981). At no time leading up to and shortly after the decision of the 
directors was Fordwor able to engage in persuasion of governors as a result of the issue not 
being politicized, neither at the level of the Board of Directors, nor at the level of the Board of 
Governors. When examining the eventual resolution regarding this dispute (11-79
5
), which 
the Board of Governors passed, it is evident that many governors were unaware of the 
severity of the issue for the most part and therefore their preferences regarding the matter did 
not become salient. The Board of Governors has nullified several decisions of the Board 
regarding Fordwor and the authority of the Board: 
 
“[The Board of Governors DECIDES:] To declare null and void the decision of the 
Board of Directors dated 28 June 1979 appointing Mr. Francis O. O. Sogunro as 
Acting President of the Bank; 
 
[…] Not to renew the term of the present Directors at the end of their statutory term” 
(Board of Governors in Fordwor, 1981, pp. 326-327). 
 
Resolution 11-79 shows that, despite the dispute between the directors and the president, the 
directors could not autonomously pursue their own preference sustainably. When other actors 
                                                     
5 See appendix document 2a for the detailed resolution 
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became aware of this impasse, the Bureau of the Board of Governors suggested to convene a 
meeting of the Board of Governors to discuss the issue, which some governors firmly 
opposed (Fordwor, 1981). The directors argued that a meeting of the Board of Governors to 
review the issue would not be necessary, considering the legality of their decision to terminate 
the term of the incumbent president under Article 36, which stated that the Board of Directors 
may elect and dismiss the president. Some member states agreed with this position, while 
others agreed with an extraordinary meeting of governors on the legal basis that the meeting 
in which the Board passed their resolution, the chairman was absent, rendering the meeting 
invalid (Fordwor, 1981). The question of whether the meeting was necessary essentially 
reflected the preferences that the governors had with respect to Fordwor’s presidency and the 
authority of the Board; the member states that did not want to convene did not oppose the 
decision by the Board and vice versa. When the impasse became apparent to the governors, 
Fordwor along with the chairman of the Board firstly attempted to persuade them of 
organizing a meeting with the Board to debate the issue:  
 
“My task was to ensure that it took place. This was the last thing the directors 
wanted” (Fordwor, 1981, p. 297). 
 
“The Ivorian minister […] was requested [by the chairman] to get his Algerian, 
Libyan, and Nigerian counterparts to persuade their governors to come” (Fordwor, 
1981, p. 304) 
 
This meeting was advantageous to the president, because it was his only chance at getting the 
decision made by the Board reversed, provided that enough governors would show up and 
register to secure a quorum. It should be noted that the politicization of the issue was not 
caused by the president himself, for the increased salience of the competing preferences of the 
governors occurred before the acts of persuasion to actually convene; the president did not 
initiate organizing a meeting of the Board of Governors. During the investigation of the 
Bureau of the Board of Governors, management sent out telexes to the governors about the 
dispute with the directors, resulting in a number of them wanting to convene under Article 
29(3) which states that the governors can at any time revoke authority delegated to the Board 
(AfDB, 2011). However, not every Governor agreed with the desirability to apply Article 
29(3) to Article 36. The meeting eventually took place in Abidjan and did not run smoothly; it 
had been adjourned several times, indicating the difficulty of reaching agreement. The time 
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frame between the acceptance of enough governors to convene and the actual meetings 
themselves was too narrow to attempt to persuade every governor. Fordwor therefore decided 
to incorporate in his speech the compromise of an independent body reviewing the issue while 
he would be put on temporary leave in order to appease some of the opposition in case the 
matter was put to a vote (Fordwor, 1981, p. 311). The issue of time, as well as the argument 
of Fordwor that actively engaging the governors may come across as an attempt at exerting 
influence, limited him in his range of autonomous action. The latter reason, however, was a 
personal choice rather than a situational limitation.  
 
In short, the clash of the two organizational bodies could not be resolved unless a sufficient 
number of governors convened in a meeting. The governors only became aware of the 
severity of the issue when the Board formally terminated Fordwor’s presidency, resulting in 
confusion with respect to the authority. Some governors wanted to discuss the matter in 
Abidjan, while others did not. For not acting would disadvantage Fordwor, he decided to 
inform every governor of what exactly was happening and attempted to persuade them to 
convene a meeting. This was made possible by their preferences becoming politicized. When 
said meeting did take place, a compromise was reached which included the termination of 
Fordwor’s duty as well as the nullification of several Board decisions. This is not to suggest 
that Fordwor did not have increased autonomy during the time after the issue had reached the 
governors and their preferences exceeded the technical domain  
 
 
Staff Expansion  
 
The staff of the Bank has been an issue area in which a wide range of differing opinions have 
been expressed. The bodies which were set up to examine the governance of the Bank turned 
to the lowest actors in the chain of delegation in order to assess effectiveness and efficiency 
(English & Mule, 1996). Interestingly, functions of different staff positions, relationships 
between staff in terms of accountability, recruitment and overall mismanagement have been 
the main areas of concern regarding staff over the decades (Fordwor, 1981; Adams & Davis, 
1996; Hafsi & Le Louarn, n.d., Mingst, 1990; Boakye, 2015). Despite the fact that staff size 
in particular has been a reoccurring issue, it has not received as much attention from scholars 
or the member states. 
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In accordance with Vaubel’s (2006) argument that the main preferences of an IO are survival 
and self-gain, the effect of politicization on staff increases will be analyzed. It should come as 
no surprise that the AfDB has had considerably less staff than other regional investment banks 
or the African division of the World Bank considering its size of operations. Scholars have 
made differing observations regarding the desirability of staff increases. Barnes (1984) noted 
the large increase in staff from 1974 to 1979 from 258 to 606 and linked this to the 
inefficiency of the Bank. On the one hand, the administrative costs in relation to the Bank’s 
financing operations is larger than that of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), the International Development Agency (IDA) and the CDC Group. On 
the other hand, purely looking at the staff increase in relation to the increase in loan 
disbursements, staff expansion has been disproportionally low from 1974 through 1986 
(Mingst, 1990, p. 10). Additionally, from 1987 through 1991, the number of staff remained 
around 1100, while loan approvals grew by around 60% (English & Mule, 1996, p. 52). These 
numbers have become more proportional, while the approval growth from 1993 to 2014 has 
been roughly 153%, staff growth from 1995 to 2014 has been approximately 158% (AfDB, 
2014; English & Mule, 1996). However, staff expansion has never been disproportionally 
high in the history of the Bank. Following Vaubel’s (2006) indicator of staff increase for 
autonomy considering its self-interest, it is evident that management did not have autonomy 
with regard to this policy area. Management has frequently requested staff increases, which 
have consistently been rejected by the Board. Especially the non-regional members strongly 
opposed these requests. The Board argued that management should first make more efficient 
use of human resources that were already available before hiring more staff and thus 
increasing operational costs on the short term (English & Mule, 1996).  
 
Considering the fact that ultimately all power is vested in the Board of Governors, they are 
able to overrule any decision made by the Board during times when a particular issue is 
politicized or when the Board of Governors collectively deem actions taken by the directors 
as undesirable with respect to the interest of the Bank; they retain full authority over anything 
that is delegated to the Board (AfDB, 2011). As shown in the case regarding resource 
mobilization, the governors all took a political stance. Contrary to that is the issue of staff 
increases, which remained delegated to the directors who did not have strikingly competing 
preferences (English & Mule, 1996). Despite the fact that there was at least some preference 
heterogeneity (English & Mule, 1996; Adams & Davis, 1996), their preferences were not 
politicized. As seen in the previous cases, when an issue becomes more politicized, the Board 
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of Governors and the member states become more involved regardless of their ordinary 
function. Since the preferences of the principals were not repetitively expressed and 
disagreement of the magnitude of the previous two cases did not occur, management did not 
have the opportunity to try to persuade them to act according to their own preference.  
 
In conclusion, the disproportionately low staff expansion rate in relation to growth in loan 
approvals until the mid 1990s and proportionate expansion rate from that point onwards, 
indicates the heavily limited ability for management to pursue their preference. The change in 
proportionality since the mid 1990s could have been a result of the ‘Knox Report’ heavily 
criticizing management, staff positions and expenditures (Hafsi & Le Louarn, 1996), 
increasing the salience of the governors’ preferences. However, it cannot be excluded that this 
minimal change could be a result of technical decisions.  
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The in depth analysis of the three cases each show the implications they have for the existing 
theory of PA. As the contribution to the theory by Darren et al. (2006) predicted for the 
AfDB, agents can use their autonomy to influence the future decisions of their principals. 
Like they argued, the distribution of voting power undoubtedly played a role in the AfDB in 
the sense that it is not dominated by one member. However, the increased autonomy as seen 
in the first two cases was not merely a result of heterogeneity without hegemon as 
Copelovitch (2010) argued. Instead, the extent to which these heterogeneous political 
preferences are salient is key to understanding the increased autonomy of the agent. The 
persuasion of governors and outside actors to mobilize support and deter opposition would 
not have been a viable option in situations where the principals are not highly politically 
involved. The reason for this can be derived from the third case; management did not have a 
principal to persuade, because none of their preferences had become politicized. No principal 
could have been deterred from acting against the preference of the agent, because the 
preferences of other principals could not be mobilized against the ones who most firmly 
opposed the preference of the agent. A summary of results is presented below, which shows 
that the second case is the most nuanced with respect to the predicted causality. The reasons 
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for this are other variables such as time, access and perception which influenced the 
dependent variable. 
 Level of politicization Level of autonomy 
Resource mobilization 
 
High 
 
High 
Dispute between president 
and Board 
 
Moderate/high 
 
Moderate 
Staff expansion 
 
Low 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
Conclusion and Reflection 
 
Taking all the findings into account, a clear relationship can be observed between 
politicization and autonomous behavior. The degree to which management was able to engage 
in persuasion depended on the increased salience of the preferences of the governors and their 
home governments. Therefore, preference heterogeneity is not a sufficient precondition for 
autonomy. Instead, the degree to which these preferences become salient plays a key role in 
the extent to which an agent can exert autonomy. The dispute between the president and the 
Board has revealed constraints on the degree to which persuasion was possible; such as 
limited time and access to principals. The findings of this thesis cannot be generalized to all 
cases of IOs, for the additional influencing factors mentioned above indicate that 
politicization is not a sufficient precondition for autonomy either. What these findings do add 
to PA literature, however, is that the salience of heterogeneous preferences, rather than 
heterogeneous preferences an sich, need not be overlooked when analyzing agency behavior, 
since politicization has shown to be a key factor. Furthermore, the increased salience of 
competing preferences does not merely increase the agent’s autonomy because the principals 
are in disagreement with regard to what measures to take; it also increases the agent’s 
autonomy because it renders the principals more susceptible to persuasion. The two 
mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, however. These findings contribute to the theoretic 
framework through which principal-agent relationships in IOs are understood. Politicization 
can have lasting effects on an IO when the agent uses this to influence its principals. An 
inherent shortcoming of the case of staff expansion is self-interest of the agent. Where 
 25 
Vaubel’s indicator of staff expansion was based on this assumption, the first case was not 
evidently characterized by self-interest. This a priori preference was fortified by the fact that 
the agent’s preference was also known, but the first case indicates that self-interest is not 
universally applicable. Additionally, Fordwor’s individual character cannot simply be 
ignored. It cannot be excluded that, he would not have engaged in persuasion, had he not been 
dedicated to try to open-up the Bank’s capital stock. Similarly, he could have resigned after 
the controversy. He chose not to, whereas his elected successor resigned after similar clashes 
with the Board (Adams & Davis, 1996). Therefore, avenues for further research include 
repetition in other IOs in order to account for individual leadership and institutional culture, 
with the aim of potentially developing a more generalizable framework.  
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Appendix 
 
The purpose of this appendix is to present the full documents of the Board of Governors 
which contribute to the analysis of the cases of resource mobilization and the institutional 
impasse leading to the termination of President Fordwor’s term. The resolutions are presented 
in chronological order with respect to time as well as case order in the thesis.  
 
1a: Resolution Kinshasa: 
 
 
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS 
 
Resolution 14-76 
 
Concerning the mobilization of resources for the African Development Bank 
 
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, 
 
HAVING REGARD to Article 5 of the Agreement Establishing the African 
Development Bank; 
 
HAVING REGARD to the Report of the Board of Directors (document 
ADB/BG/XII/5/Corr.1); 
 
CONSIDERING the need to ensure that the Bank has sufficient capital resources to 
develop its operational activities;  
 
CONSIDERING the limited financial resources of the African countries due to the 
current economic situation, 
 
RESOLVES to instruct the President to take all steps, if necessary in consultation with 
the Governors, with a view of fostering the mobilization of resources to the exclusion 
of participation by non-African countries (AfDB in Fordwor, 1981, p. 90). 
 
 
 
1b: Resolution Port Louis 
 
BOARD OF GOVERNORS 
 
Resolution 07-77 
 
Concerning the mobilization of Resources for the Bank 
 
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, 
 
HAVING REGARD to Articles 2(c) and 5 of the Agreement establishing the African 
Development Bank; 
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HAVING REGARD to the report of the Board of Directors (document ADB/BG/XII/5 
of 8 April 1977); 
 
CONSIDERING the need to ensure that the Bank has sufficient capital resources to 
develop its operational activities; 
 
CONSIDERING the limited resources of the African countries; 
 
CONSIDERING the positive developments in the work of the Development 
Committee of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund; 
 
INSTRUCTS the President, in close consultation with the Board of Directors, to 
resume the study on the mobilisation of resources with a view of examining various 
possibilities for increasing the resources of the Bank on a permanent basis, while 
maintaining the African character of the Bank; 
 
REQUESTS the president, in close consultation with the Board of Directors, to 
embark on this study without delay and to present a report to the Board of Governors 
by 31 January 1978 at the latest (AfDB in Fordwor, 1981, p. 97). 
 
 
 
1c: Resolution Libreville 
 
BOAD OF GOVERNORS 
 
Resolution 02-78 
 
Concerning the Mobilization of Resources for the Bank 
 
(adopted at the closed sitting held on 1 May 1978) 
 
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, 
 
HAVING REGARD to the Agreement establishing the African Development Bank, in 
particular Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 29 and 60 thereof; 
 
HAVING REGARD to its Resolution 07-77 adopted at the 3
rd
 Plenary Session of its 
13
th
 Annual Meeting on 5 May 1977 in Mauritius on MOBILIZATION OF 
RESOURCES; 
 
HAVING TAKEN NOTE of the Report presented by the President of the Bank after 
close consultation with the Board of Directors, entitled “MOBILIZATION OF 
RESOURCES FOR THE BANK 1977-1986 (January 1978); 
 
HAVING carefully studies the recommendations of the said Report; 
 
CONSCIOUS of the expanding role which the Bank has to play in the Mobilization of 
Resources outside Africa to supplement those already mobilized within Africa, 
especially with respect to subscription to the capital stock of the Bank; 
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TAKING NOTE of the remarkable results obtained within and outside the African 
continent as a result of multilateral cooperation between regional, sub-regional and 
national development banks; 
 
ACCEPTS the principle of opening the capital stock of the Bank to subscription by 
non-regional States on the basis of the principles set out in the Annex to this 
resolution; 
 
CALLS UPON all States desirous of giving substantial assistance to the African 
continent in its economic and social development to augment the assistance they have 
already given to the African States by making an effective response to this invitation 
to subscribe to the capital stock of the Bank; 
 
REQUESTS the President of the Bank, in close consultation with the Board of 
Directors, to initiate consultations with all willing non-African States with a view of 
inviting them to subscribe to the capital stock of the Bank on the basis, inter alia, of 
the principles set out in the Annex; 
 
REQUESTS the President of the Bank, in close consultation with the Board of 
Directors: 
 
(a) To study all the legal and administrative implications attendant on the opening of 
the capital stock of the Bank to non-regional participation; 
 
(b) To present to the Board of Governors not later than 28 February 1979 a definitive 
report on the said consultations with non-regional States on their subscriptions to 
the capital stock of the Bank and on the amendments that would have to be made 
to the Bank Agreement and its Rules and Regulations for the purpose of enabling 
its capital stock to be so opened, on the conditions compatible with the 
maintenance of the African character of the Institution (see Annex). 
 
 
 
ANNEX 
 
By the “maintenance of the African character of the Institution”, the Board of 
Governors understands the maintenance of the following principles and conditions for 
the admission of non-African States into membership of the Bank, namely: 
 
(1) That the leadership of the Bank should always remain in the hands of regional 
members; in particular, that the President of the Bank will always be a national of 
a regional state, and a minimum condition of his appointment should be majority 
support from regional members. 
 
(2) That the Bank shall confine its loan operations to the African continent as defined 
in the Agreement, and that the Bank’s Headquarters would always be located in 
Africa. 
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(3) That voting power shall be distributed in such a way that regional members would 
have a majority of 66 2/3% of the total number of votes. 
 
(4) That decisions on the policies of the Bank should be made subject to a majority of 
51% votes. 
 
(5) That the quorum of meetings of the Board of Governors should be constituted by 
the attendance of members holding not less than 66 2/3% of the total number of 
votes, including 35% of regional votes. 
 
(6) That the Board of Directors shall consist of 12 members, 9 of whom shall 
represent regional members and 3 non-regional members. 
 
(7) That recruitment policy would always be formulated in such a way as to preserve 
the regional character of the organization. 
 
(8) That the admission of non-regional States to membership of the Bank should not 
result in a substitution for their contributions and subscriptions to the Fund’s 
resources of their subscriptions to the capital stock of the Bank. 
 
(9) That non-regional membership will in no way entail a modification of the Bank’s 
established policy of using only economic criteria for the formulation of its loan 
policies (AfDB in Fordwor, 1981, pp. 121-123). 
 
 
 
 
2a: Resolution Abidjan during the Extraordinary Meeting 
 
BOARD OF GOVERNORS 
 
Resolution 11-79 
 
Concerning measures to restore the normal functioning of the African Development 
Bank  
 
(Adopted at the Extraordinary Meeting held in Abidjan from 23-26 July 1979) 
 
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, 
 
1. Having regard to Articles 4; 29(1) and (3); 31; 32; 33; 34; 35(2) and (3); and 37 of 
the Agreement establishing the African Development Bank (the Bank Agreement), 
and to their Resolutions No. 16-76 of 7
th
 May 1976 (adopted at Kinshasa) and No. 
8-79 of 17
th
 May 1979 (adopted in Abidjan); 
 
2. AFTER considering all the problems relating to the situation prevailing within the 
African Development Bank as set out in the Report of the Bureau of the Board of 
Governors on the ADB crisis (Doc. ADB/BG/EXTRA/79/01/3) submitted to the 
Board of Governors; 
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3. MINDFUL of the prime necessity of guaranteeing the stability and smooth 
functioning of the Bank and of ensuring close and fruitful cooperation between all 
its organs; 
 
4. DESIROUS of ensuring as speedily as possible the normal functioning of the 
Bank; 
 
5. MINDFUL of preserving, on the one hand, the higher interests of the Bank and, on 
the other hand, the unity of the African continent; 
 
6. DESIDES; 
 
1. To pay tribute to Dr. Kwame Donkor Fordwor for his great contribution to 
the development of the Bank’s activities; 
 
2. To put Dr. Kwame D. Fordwor on indefinite open leave; 
 
3. To declare null and void the decision of the Board of Directors dated 28 
June 1979 appointing Mr. Francis O. O. Sogunro as Acting President of the 
Bank; 
 
4. To appoint Mr. G. E. Gondwe as Acting President of the Bank as of 26 
July 1979 until the next Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors in May 
1980 and to call upon the Board of Directors to confirm him in his new 
functions on the understanding that he may not be a candidate for the 
Presidency of the Bank on the expiration of his interim term of office; 
 
5. To entrust the Acting President solely with the conducting of th day-to-day 
affairs, while any action of political nature shall be the direct responsibility 
of the Chairman of the Board of Governors during the interim period; 
 
6. To censure the Board of Directors for the hasty manner with which it took 
the important decision of dismissing the President of the Bank and 
appointing an Acting President without consulting the Board of Governors 
which constitutes the supreme organ of the Bank; 
 
7. Not to renew the term of the present Directors at the end of their statutory 
term; 
 
8. To advance to 1 August 1979 the assumption of duty of the Directors 
elected at the May 1979 Annual Meeting. 
 
 
 
 
